A recent report from the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) warns that countries supplying arms to regions where Russian private military companies (PMCs) are active may be violating international arms control agreements.
The report underscores deficiencies in global arms oversight systems, which struggle to address the ambiguous boundaries between PMCs and regular national armed forces, as well as the intersection of conflict and organized crime.
This oversight enables mercenaries to appropriate arms meant for their official clients, potentially employing those weapons in the commission of war crimes, according to GI-TOC.
The Wagner Group has faced accusations of perpetrating massacres, torture, and sexual violence against civilians since its initial deployment in Mali, following a request from the country’s ruling junta, along with looting local communities and extorting industries such as the profitable gold mining sector.
Since the group’s involvement, civilian casualties in Mali reportedly doubled from 2021 to 2024 compared to prior years.
When the mercenaries first entered the country, they weren’t fully equipped. GI-TOC’s research, which included open-source visuals and interviews with sources within Mali, indicated that the Wagner Group procured weapons through combat and theft from the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa).
This strategy allowed Wagner to operate with greater secrecy and collaborate more closely with FAMa, while also being cost-effective for Moscow, stated Julia Stanyard, a senior analyst at GI-TOC, in an interview with The Moscow Times.
“They were able to extend Russia’s influence throughout Africa with limited numbers of troops and equipment,” she noted. “This also highlights their unique operational methods, which differ from other international players.”
The report mentioned various types of equipment, including armored vehicles from China, the UAE, Nigeria, and France; vehicle-mounted weapons sourced from China; and claims of Turkish Bayraktar drones being sighted at Wagner locations.
The Turkish Defense Ministry asserted that any claims regarding the use of Bayraktar drones by third parties without “official statements or verified evidence” should not be deemed credible.
Researchers pointed out that the utilization of this equipment could violate the Arms Trade Treaty, which mandates that arms exporters and their clients ensure that their weapons are not utilized against civilians or in war crimes.
Mali, China, Nigeria, and France are signatories to the treaty, while the UAE and Turkey have yet to ratify it, relying on their domestic regulations to oversee arms exports.
Many of the arms transfers occurred prior to Wagner’s entry into Mali. However, after Wagner’s deployment, China, Turkey, and the UAE continued to provide equipment to Mali, even as evidence surfaced regarding the use of captured arms.
GI-TOC researchers contended that there was ample publicly available information surrounding these transactions, suggesting that exporters should have been able to assess the potential risk of their equipment being employed by mercenaries.
In June 2025, Wagner announced it would be withdrawing from Mali, having “completed its mission” there, and was succeeded by the Africa Corps, an entity managed by the Russian Defense Ministry.
This transition enables the Kremlin to maintain tighter control over this profitable military force while retaining its personnel; 70-80% of Africa Corps members previously served in the Wagner Group.
The report indicated that it is too soon to determine the extent to which the Africa Corps has acquired weapons originally supplied to FAMa.
The new group has also deployed several armored vehicles and aircraft that Russia sent to Mali in 2025, though it remains unclear whether this equipment was designated for the mercenary group or for FAMa.
