In May 2025, President Vladimir Putin expressed a “warm” welcome to Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan leader, at the Kremlin, wishing him “all the very best” as they formalized a strategic partnership agreement. However, following the U.S. government’s seizure of Maduro and its declaration of oversight over Venezuela—Russia’s ally in South America—Putin has remained notably silent.

With Maduro currently awaiting trial on criminal charges in New York, the Kremlin seems to be adopting a cautious stance in response to the latest actions of the Trump administration to assert dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Analysts suggest that although Maduro’s apprehension might tarnish Russia’s image as a dependable ally, the implications for Moscow may not be extensive.

According to former Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev, “Russia has never held particularly strong diplomatic or military positions in Latin America. What it risks losing in Venezuela are oil contracts and investments.”

While Moscow has called for Maduro’s release, it has not taken any significant measures to support him since the U.S. operation began. The Kremlin has also expressed its support for Venezuela’s interim leader Delcy Rodríguez, denouncing what it termed “neocolonial threats and armed aggression from abroad.”

Moreover, when U.S. authorities confiscated a Russian-flagged oil tanker linked to Venezuela in the North Atlantic recently, Moscow accused Washington of escalating tensions but did not respond with any decisive actions.

“Russian officials and propagandists find themselves in a difficult position,” remarked Alexander Baunov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “There are no directives to sever ties with Trump, and none are likely to come. At the same time, they must denounce actions against an ally, as the global majority is watching.”

“However, overly expressing outrage would only expose their vulnerabilities: they were unable to aid, prevent, or slow down these developments,” he added.

Venezuela remains one of the few nations that have preserved amicable relations with Moscow following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Concurrently, dialogue between Russia and the U.S. has resumed since Donald Trump took office again last year, as he seeks to mediate a peace agreement concerning Ukraine.

“The United States has showcased what a ‘special military operation’ looks like. It’s evident that questions will arise in Russia about why they couldn’t achieve the same in Ukraine,” Baunov said.

Pro-Kremlin commentators have adopted a mixed stance on Maduro’s capture, denouncing it as a violation of international law while contrasting the U.S.’s success with Russia’s inability to unseat Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky, in February 2022.

Although Putin might face a reputational setback for failing to safeguard an ally, he could leverage Maduro’s capture strategically in the conflict over Ukraine, Bondarev suggested. “The U.S. openly indicates its willingness to divide the world into spheres of influence,” he remarked. “Yet Putin aims for a similar division and desires his own sphere of influence. The developments in Venezuela could benefit him—he can engage in discussions about spheres of influence with Trump.”

“Moreover, new justifications for Putin’s war in Ukraine will arise: ‘If Trump is doing as he pleases, why can’t we do the same?'” he noted.

Experts indicate that Moscow’s potential economic losses are likely to be minor. The Trump administration has conveyed to Rodríguez that Caracas must comply with specific demands from the White House before being permitted to increase oil production—its economic lifeline. Among these requirements is the expulsion of Russia, China, Iran, and Cuba, along with severing economic ties. ABC’s sources revealed that Venezuela must also agree to partner solely with the U.S. for oil production and prioritize Washington in sales of heavy crude.

Trade figures show that Russia and Venezuela’s exchanges totaled approximately $200 million in 2024, compared to $245 billion between Russia and China, according to the exiled news outlet Agentstvo. Russian exports to Venezuela largely consist of oil products, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural goods, as per Russian Ambassador Sergei Melik-Bagdasarov.

By 2025, Russia emerged as a crucial supplier of petroleum products necessary for diluting Venezuela’s heavy crude after U.S. shipments ceased, as reported by Bloomberg. Caracas also approved a continuation of oil joint ventures between state-owned PDVSA and Russia’s Roszarubezhneft, extending their operations until 2041 with an anticipated investment of about $616 million.

However, Stanislav Mitrakhovich, an analyst at Russia’s National Energy Security Fund, stated that Russia no longer has substantial oil initiatives in Venezuela. “When looking at the last 10 to 15 years, this is now a relatively small endeavor,” Mitrakhovich told the Kommersant business daily. “There might have been strategic plans regarding Russia’s influence in that region, but there are now no significant economic projects left aimed at generating substantial revenue.”

In addition to oil products, Venezuela has acquired various military equipment from Russia, including MANPADS, tanks, and air defense systems. Russian imports mainly consist of agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee, tropical fruits, and alcoholic beverages.

Despite the Trump administration’s assertions that “this is OUR hemisphere,” industrial expert Maxim Khudalov told Kommersant that Russia is unlikely to completely withdraw from the region. “Given the current state of communications with the Americans, they seem open to cooperation, even with Russia,” Khudalov noted.

While the specific economic repercussions of the leadership shifts in Venezuela for Russia remain uncertain, Baunov highlighted that the political consequences for Moscow are equally ambiguous. “If Trump successfully instigates regime changes not just in Venezuela but also in Iran, Putin will find himself weakened. Conversely, if Trump fails or becomes mired in difficulties, Putin might emerge stronger. It’s possible that he could end up needing assistance from Putin,” he pointed out.

“The challenge with American operations of this nature is their asymmetry: they are possible only against weaker nations,” he said. “Venezuela is indeed a very weak state…such actions tend to reinforce the notion that the powerful are entitled to dominate the weak,” Baunov remarked, emphasizing that for Moscow, “the accumulation of valuable precedents has increased.”